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1 This report has been compiled by Joanna Chataway on the basis of interviews (carried out by Joanna 
Chataway and Joyce Tait), the PITA company dossier and a number of published reports. Cognitive 
maps have been developed from interviews. The Spanish team carried out interviews with managers 
based in Spain. Interviews were carried out with 2 Senior managers in the UK, 3 Senior and 1 middle 
manager based in other parts of Europe and 1 senior manager based in the US.  
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Introduction to the PITA Project 
Technological innovation in the agrochemical, biotechnology and seeds industries and in 
associated public sector research establishments (PSREs) has the potential to deliver more 
socially and environmentally sustainable farming systems and to improve the quality of life of 
citizens in Europe. This is particularly true of farms on the most fertile land. However, 
although policies developed in different areas may all aim to improve the quality of life, in 
practice, in their influence on company and PSRE strategies, they frequently counteract one 
another and so attenuate the desired effect.  
Market-related factors also influence decision making in industry and PSREs, the most 
important for this project being the policies of food processors and distributors and also public 
attitudes and opinion, which often set more demanding standards than those of national 
governments and the EU. 
The PITA project (see Project Structure) is developing an integrated analysis of policies and 
market-related factors relevant to the agrochemical, biotechnology and seeds sectors. The 
core of the project is an investigation of the impact of these factors on the strategies and 
decision making of companies and PSREs and the downstream implications of these 
decisions on employment, international competitiveness and environmental benefits. The 
final outcome will be feedback of our conclusions to policy makers and company managers. 
The range of policies and other influences studied includes:  
• policies to stimulate innovation in the agrochemical, biotechnology and seeds industries; 
• purchasing policies of food processors and distributors; 
• policies for international trade liberalisation;  
• policies for the regulation of industry and farming (for environmental protection and public 
health and safety, particularly for pesticides and biotechnology); 
• agricultural and farming support policies, particularly for crop production; 
• policies to promote environmental sustainability and wildlife biodiversity in arable farming 
areas; 
• public opinion and attitudes. 
The overall aim of the project is to contribute to the development of sustainable industrial and 
farming systems and an improved quality of life by encouraging the development and uptake 
of ‘cleaner’ technology for intensive agriculture. Its objectives are:  
• to develop an integrated analysis of policies and market-related factors relevant to 
technological innovation in the agrochemical, biotechnology and seeds sectors, to study their 
interactions and to develop hypotheses about their impact on strategic decision making in 
industry and PSREs. 
• to study the influence of policies and market-related factors on innovation strategies in the 
agrochemical, biotechnology and seeds industries and PSREs, and their impact on decisions 
about product development, levels of investment and location of investment. 
• to study the outcomes of the industry decisions investigated under objective 2, in their effects 
on employment, on international competitiveness and on their potential to deliver 
environmental benefits.  
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1. Introduction 
Since the late 1980s Monsanto has wanted to be known for its prowess in biotechnology. 
This, above all, has been the major driver of its strategy for more than a decade. Current 
difficulties being experienced by the company mean that it perhaps risks infamy, rather than 
fame, as the executor of a strategy that has not succeeded.  
Monsanto has had a rather narrow technological base in agricultural chemicals. A narrow 
product range, increasing technical difficulties in identifying new chemical based products, 
good profits from the products which it did have and a leadership team convinced that new 
technology would constitute the bedrock of future growth, lay the foundations of Monsanto’s 
pursuit of leadership in biotechnology. Early on Monsanto identified itself as a Life Sciences 
company and put the new biotechnologies at the heart of its structure and plans. The 
company has succeeded in identifying itself with the new technology. However, at this 
juncture that signifies more problems than opportunities. 
The recent merger with Pharmacia/Upjohn has not resolved difficulties for the company’s 
agricultural division. The new leadership has indicated its intention of selling off the division 
after a poor stock-market response to initial plans to continue with an integrated ‘life 
sciences’ company approach. 
The first section of this monograph provides some figures about Monsanto and some data 
about acquisitions and partnerships.   Section 2 looks at Monsanto’s current commercial 
profile in Agriculture. This section mainly draws on company documents and industry 
analysis. The middle sections of the document (sections 3 - 6) are based on interviews, 
company documents and industry analysis. These sections explain Monsanto’s approach to 
innovation and R&D, the way in which its organisation and culture impact of innovation and 
R&D Decision making and the way in which policy is perceived to impact innovation and R&D 
plans. Quotes are all in italics. We have also used cognitive maps in this section (please see 
Appendix 1 for a brief explanation of the cognitive mapping technique). These maps are 
based on managers’ thoughts and the way in which they linked ideas. 
The concluding section is a reflection on Monsanto’s approach and what it is that is 
distinctive about the company. This section is based on industry analysis and our own 
understanding. 
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1.1 Key Monsanto figures 
Monsanto is a global company. It operates in three main divisions: pharmaceutical; nutrition 
and agriculture. Global figures covering all three divisions are as follows: 
World accounts: geographical breakdown 
Table 1 World Accounts2. 
$bn ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 
Net sales incl. 
chemicals 
7.90 8.27 8.96 9.26   
Net sales excl. 
chemicals 
3.68 4.6* 5.4* 6.3* 7.5 8.6 
Net sales 
Europe & Africa 
1.56    1.4 1.6 
Operating Profit 
(before 
exceptional 
items)** 
0.81 0.92 0.98 0.59 0.3 -0.25 
Net profit/loss     0.9 0.6 
R&D expenses   0.56 0.64 0.94 1.26 
Assets world 8.64 8.89 10.6  10.7 16.72 
Assets Europe & 
Africa 
    1.8 2.80 
       
Employees  29,400 28,500 28,000 21,900 31,800 
Sales: ‘Europe & Africa’ accounted for approx. $1.4bn/$7.5bn – 19% of world sales in 1997 
Assets: ‘Europe & Africa’ accounted for approx. $1.8bn/$10.7bn – 17% of world assets in 1997. 
‘Agriculture’ business unit 
Monsanto’s accounts treat agriculture as agrochemicals and seeds combined. It is extremely 
difficult to get financial figures which disagregate the agriculture sector.   The following 
figures come from annual reports. 
Agricultural/total company ratios 
Sales: agricultural products accounted for $3.1bn/$7.5bn – 42% of total world sales in 1997 
(Nutrition and Consumer products; 20%, Pharmaceuticals, 32%; Corporate and other 6%.)  
Assets: agricultural assets accounted for $4.5bn/$10.8bn – 42% of total world assets in 1997 
                                                     
2 * For the sake of comparability with subsequent years, the figures exclude income (approx. $3bn) from 
industrial chemicals – a unit which was sold off in 1997. 
** Rather than ‘operating profit’, this figure is ‘operating income’ = net sales - (cost of goods + expenses). 
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Table 2 Agricultural Division Accounts3 
$bn ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 
Net sales 1.9 2.22 2.47 2.5 3.1 4.0 
Net sales 
Europe & Africa 
0.4? 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5  
Operating Profit 
(before 
exceptional 
items)** 
0.48 0.47 0.51 0.54 0.11 0.8 
Net profit      1.1 
R&D expenses       
Assets 2.1 2.4 2.6 3.0 4.5 10.3 
Agricultural products: geographical breakdown of sales (AR 1997, p.36, chart) 
1996: ‘Europe & Africa’ accounted for approx. $0.5bn/$2.6bn – 20% of agricultural world 
sales in 1996 
1997: ‘Europe & Africa’ accounted for approx. $0.5bn/$3.2bn – 16% of agricultural world 
sales in 1997   (i.e. sales did not increase there as the world total increased). 
More disagregated figures relating to the breakdown of chemicals, seeds and traits do not 
seem to be in the public domain. The scale of Monsanto’s investment in seeds and 
biotechnology can be measured, albeit less accurately, from other company sources. The 
following graph comes from a presentation by company President Henrik Verfaillie (Verfaillie, 
1999). Its shows the ag-chem/seeds and traits profile of Monsanto’s revenue as compared 
with other competitors. 
                                                     
3 ** Rather than ‘operating profit’, this figure is ‘operating income’ = net sales - (cost of goods + expenses). 
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Figure 1 Ag Industry Leaders 
The proportion of Monsanto’s share of revenue from seeds/traits is matched only by 
Dupont/Pioneer. Investment in seed companies is discussed later in the section on 
innovation strategies. R&D spending is also discussed in that section. More information about 
the performance of Monsanto’s chemical and biotechnology based products is provided in 
the next section. 
Monsanto has pursued an aggressive acquisitions policy. This is discussed in detail later in 
the report. It has also formed an extensive web of partnerships both with companies that it 
has acquired, setting up new ventures and with other companies. It has pursued this strategy 
to fulfill both marketing and R&D objectives. The following provide some detail about 
research partnerships and subsidiaries. 
Box 1. Research agreements 
Monsanto has numerous research agreements for genomics, especially for 
pharmaceuticals. Monsanto has always pursued a strategy of creating research 
partnerships as a way to build capacity (Joly, 1999). Partnerships are thought of as 
important for building research capabilities.  
This list however includes only those relevant to agriculture. 
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Title Name of 
partners 
Type of 
agreement 
Amount Duration priorities 
Arqule  ? $12m+ 1997-2002 chemicals + 
crop-protection 
agents 
Renessen Cargill ? $200m  animal feed and 
processing traits 
 IBM Genomics    
Mendel 
Biotechnology 
Empresas La 
Modernas 
Genomics  1998-?  
Cereon 
Genomics LLC 
Millennium 
Pharmaceuticals 
Genomics $218m 1998-? plants 
Incyte Synteni?   1998 micro-arrays of 
plant genes 
Gene Trace  Genomics $17m 1998 licence 
genomics 
The following tables document key subsidiaries in Europe and worldwide. 
Table 3 European subsidiaries4 
Name of the 
company 
Director Structure/ 
price of 
Ownership 
Date of 
creation/ 
acquisition 
Sites in 
Europe 
(countries) 
Type of 
activity 
Type of 
product or 
technology 
Number of 
employees 
Hybri Tech*   1985 UK,FR,DE,B
E, + 
R-P-C hybrid wheat  
PBIC**  $0.5bn 1998 UK,FR,DE R-P? wheat etc. 280 
TwinAgro jv with 
Bayer 
 ?   Pesticides  
                                                     
4 Type of activity : R = research / P = production / C = commercialisation 
* HybriTech Seeds International was created in 1982. HybriTech Europe SNC was created by Monsanto 
and Pau Euralis in 1985. 
** PBIC never published documents in its own name; all accounts were part of Unilever.  
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Table 4 Non-European Subsidiaries5 
Name of the 
company 
Director Price $bn Date* of 
creation/ 
acquisition 
Sites Type of 
activity 
Type of 
product or 
technology 
Calgene/Gargiulo  0.24 1995+97 USA R-P-C tomato etc. 
Agracetus  0.15 1996 USA R-P? genomics 
DeKalb Genetics  4.4 1996+98 USA R-P-C many crops 
Asgrow Agronomics  0.24 1997 USA R-P-C squash,soybea
n 
Holden’s  1.0 1997 USA R-P-C maize, etc. 
Sementes 
Agroceres 
  1997 Brasil R-P-C maize, etc. 
Cargill Intl  1.4 1997 US-
Mexico 
R-P-C many crops 
Mahyco   1997? India C? cotton 
First Line Seeds   1998 Canada R-P-C soybean, etc. 
Delta & Pine Landxxx  2.0 1998 USA R-P-C cotton, etc. 
D&M Intl [D&PL]  1998 Argentina P-C cotton 
Cargill-North 
America** 
 not sale  USA-
Canada 
C  
2. Monsanto’s profile in agriculture 
2.1 Current commercial profile  
Round-up and Round-up Ready. 
Monsanto’s main agriculture product is Roundup, an enormously successful broad spectrum 
herbicide which has marketed as having relatively benign environmental impacts (AR, 97 and 
98). A primary concern for the company has been that Roundup has either come off or is 
coming off patent in main markets. The company has responded with a strategy to prolong 
the lifespan of the product as the following slide from the Verfaillie presentation shows. 
                                                     
5 * Two dates indicate a step-wise acquisition of the company. 
** Agreement to store, process and sell specialty products (being developed as ‘identity-preserved’, 
unlike the bulk commodity crops). 
 
xxx This acquisition has now been called off by Monsanto 
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Figure 2 Roundup Herbicide Strategy Addresses Risks and Delivers 
Income 
 
 
The following quote from the Annual report expands upon pricing strategy and strategic 
supply agreements. 
“A key factor in volume growth for Roundup is a strategy based on price elasticity, 
with selective price reductions followed by larger percentage volume increases. To 
support the strategy, we’ll continue to expand our capacity for producing 
glyphosate…to meet volume growth and reduce costs…To create additional 
value, we’ve completed a series of agreements to license certain registration data 
for Roundup and to supply glyphosate from our low-cost production capacity” (AR 
1998:7). 
Roundup sales reportedly increased by 25% in 1997. According to SRI Consulting, 
glyphosate was being sprayed on 30m acres in the USA in 1997; that figure was expected to 
rise rapidly, even to double within a few years, thus outstripping its competitors (Wood/Fairley 
in CW 04.02.98). 
Roundup sales increased by 20% in 1998, though the gains were offset by the lowered price 
which Monsanto had set in order to head off generic competition. Price reduction was an 
important factor in volume growth via price elasticity, especially in Canada, Argentina and 
Brazil. Monsanto can reduce the production cost of glyphosate through volume increases and 
technological innovation (AR 1998: 32-33).   Whilst Round-up sales have increased, sales of 
other herbicides including Harness and Lasso have decreased (SEC, Jun30, 1999) 
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Seeds and traits 
The prolongation of Roundup by integrating seeds, biotech and ag-chems has been a 
cornerstone of Monsanto’s strategy. Commercially, the approach as yielded startling rewards 
as indicated by the growth of Round-up Ready seeds sales. RR-soybeans accounted for 
35% of the US soybean market in 1998. Between 1998 and 2002 a three-fold increase in 
sales of RR crops is expected.   A four-fold increase of Monsanto’s insect-protected crops is 
also expected. (AR 1998: 13). 
The commercial success of Monsanto’s biotechnology-based products has been startling. Its 
Roundup Ready and Bt Cotton have sold well. In 1999, just four years from commercial 
introduction, an estimated 40% of the total United States corn, soybean and cotton acreage 
were planted with herbicide-and insect-resistant genetically manipulated crops. One industry 
analyst puts it as follows: 
To put this level of adoption in perspective, one may consider it against that of the 
most dominant agricultural technology of the past—hybrid corn. To make the 
comparison more pronounced one may consider the average adoption rate of 
hybrid corn for only Iowa, Illinois and Wisconsin, which exhibited some of the 
highest adoption rates among all relevant states. The comparison is revealing. In 
1999, an estimated 51% of soybean acres were planted with Roundup Ready 
soybeans. It took seven years for the selected States to reach similar adoption 
levels in the case of hybrid corn. In some States it took twenty years or more. 
Bacillus thuringiensis corn (Bt-corn), Roundup Ready and Bt cotton also exhibit 
adoption rates significantly faster than hybrid corn (Kalaitzandonakes, 1999) 
Monsanto’s plans for biotech crops are integrally linked to global expansion. “Plantings of 
commercialised biotechnology crops grew from approximately 18 million acres in 1997 to 57 
million in 1998. Global plantings are expected to increase to 183 million acres by 2002, with 
an increasing share outside North America” (AR, 1998:12). 
Latin America and Asia Pacific feature as particularly important in future plans, as the 
following graph shows: 
Figure 3 Monsanto biotechnology crops; plantings by region 
 
Green= United States and Canada 
Brown= Latin America 
Blue= Asia-Pacific 
Yellow- Europe and Africa 
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Monsanto predicts that its product pipeline value is $9 billion. The following table shows how 
this is planned. 
Table 5 Pipeline Value - $9 billion. 
ANNEX C11 
15 
2.2 Monsanto in Europe 
Europe is important to Monsanto for three main reasons. The first is sales. Monsanto’s 
reporting categories combine Europe and Africa. Together they represent just under 20% of 
sales, with Europe accounting for the overwhelming bulk of this figure.  
The second reason is that, since the purchase of the UK based Plant Breeding Institute, the 
UK and the rest of Europe have become much more strategically important. Maps 1 and 8 
show some of the thinking around this. The acquisition of PBI is a product of the very 
aggressive acquisition strategy that Monsanto has pursued. It signifies a strategic decision to 
focus on wheat and therefore to make Europe an essential part of Monsanto’s business 
(interviews).  
The decision to focus on wheat is tied to Monsanto’s faith in new technology. The promise of 
wheat will not result from current market structure. The European and US markets that are 
the main markets are highly competitive and unlikely to increase substantially. It is likely that 
wheat markets in South East Asia will expand, but the real breakthrough will come from new 
innovations, such as a hybrid. As one manager put it, “multiply the number of acres under 
wheat today by some technology fee, whatever way you do it, you obviously come up with a 
very big number”. 
The third reason is that what happens in terms of public opinion and regulation in Europe has 
an impact on what happens in the rest of the world. If European retailers decide against GMO 
crops suppliers from the world will opt to plant GMO free produce. An outcry about the safety 
of GM crops in Europe may reverberate in other continents (interviews).  
2.3 Company earnings 
Earnings from established agricultural, pharmaceutical and nutrition products grew until 1998, 
when continued investment in seeds and biotechnology caused the EBIT figure for that year 
to drop as the following table and notes explain.  
Table 6 Continuing operations produce growing EBIT and funding for 
growth 
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“Earnings from Monsanto’s established products have provided funding for 
investments to expand our long-term earnings potential. By managing our leading 
products to deliver growing returns, Monsanto has increased EBIT (earnings 
before interest expense and income taxes, excluding unusual items), while also 
increasing our reinvestment of potential earnings in growth spending. The sum of 
EBIT and growth spending increased at a 24 percent compound annual growth 
rate from 1993 to 1998, from $1.1 billion to $3.1 billion. 
The demand for investment in growth – for seed company acquisitions and 
commercialisation of products in our pipeline – is holding down EBIT today. But 
these investments are expected to support EBIT growth in coming years, at the 
same time that growth spending levels off (Annual Report, 1998). 
A planned merger with AHP would have relieved the debt incurred from acquiring companies. 
When the merger fell through, Monsanto announced a divestment plan that involved in selling 
non-strategic assets. This plan amounted to about $5 billion worth of sales and is in 
implementation. Assets being sold include: artificial sweetners, garden products, pollution 
control, water treatment systems, biodegradable plastics and polymers. Administrative jobs 
cuts were also planned to reduce costs by $500 million a year (C&I, 07.12.98). These plans 
are being implemented with divestments taking place on an ongoing basis. 
The later section on innovation strategy discusses in more detail the company’s future plans 
for ag-chems, seeds and traits. The conclusion discusses some of the doubts that have been 
raised about Monsanto’s future projections. 
3. Innovation strategy  
“We have an almost unshakeable faith in our biotechnology” (Senior Monsanto 
manager) 
In the opinion of managers interviewed Monsanto’s strategy is technology driven, pushed 
forward by a conviction in the vision of being a knowledge based company developing 
leading edge technology. The main research base is in St. Louis, although acquisitions such 
as Cargill and PBIC also have significant research facilities. In November 1998, the company 
also opened a new molecular plant breeding facility in Ankeny, Iowa. Monsanto has smaller 
research facilities in many locations.  
One manager commented that while the emphasis is now on biotechnology, Monsanto 
recognises that biotech doesn’t solve all problems. For that reason, Monsanto is still 
developing new herbicides such as Maverick for wheat. Other new agro-chemicals include 
MON 65500 a fungicide for control of take-all disease in wheat. Another manager 
commented that while the company is still producing new chemicals “Its not having the same 
importance, its not the major focus of the company now”. 
A manager explained that the company had made an early commitment to biotechnology, 
aiming to be the first in breaking new ground. Before the first product was ready to market, 
Monsanto had “made an upfront investment in facilities and the best scientists” and had 
made “a commitment to a 20 year development of GM crops”. This has highlighted the role of 
new technology in the company.  
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3.1 Integration of chemicals, seeds and traits 
The following slide taken from the Verfaillie presentation shows that the company planned to 
integrate ag-chems, seeds and traits. 
Figure 4 SEED INTEGRATION UNDER WAY 
 
 
The company’s strengths include genomics, germplasm (mainly from acquisitions), plant 
breeding, Roundup and resistance gene in RR-crops, patents on numerous transgenes for 
plants, seed distribution (mainly from Cargill acquisition and agreement). 
Monsanto managers see the company as “built on the original marriage between chemistry 
and biology”. RR crops were the obvious choice for development. Based on input traits which 
might appeal to the farmer, but not necessarily the consumer, the RR crops reflected 
Monsanto’s view of its traditional customer base and prioritisation of them as primary 
stakeholders. One manager also explained that, at this point, R&D decisions were also very 
much science driven. Input traits, such as herbicide resistance in soya bean were the feasible 
option.  
We ended up doing soya beans because we understood the trait, we ended up 
doing corn because it was possible…the fact is we did what we could do, we didn’t 
follow it on the basis of, you know, if you looked at wheat, which is one of the 
harder crops to transfer… (Senior Monsanto manager). 
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Cognitive map no. 1 shows one manager’s thinking with regard to the evolution of R&D 
decision making and where the company would like it to go in the future. 
Map 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Current products combine biotechnology and chemistry either in the shape of RR or inserting 
single BT genes into plants. Future products will be based on genomics.   The aim here is to 
use genomics to develop better products which will work faster and more effectively. Another 
manager stressed the importance of seed treatments rather than conventional chemical 
applications such as herbicides, saying “to develop the best chemicals, faster, that’s not the 
route that Monsanto’s chosen”. 
The other characteristic strand of ‘second generation’ products are products which exhibit 
output rather than input traits. These could include soyabean, rapeseed oils and plant 
derivatives that are good for the heart and blood vessels (FT, Nov 11, 1999). However, these 
products are likely to take some time to bring to market. As one manager put it, there is no 
“magic product” which will resolve short term perception problems. There are very few 
indications from either interviews managers or other sources that products designed to 
appeal directly to consumers are likely to be available soon. Map 1 indicates that the focus 
on farmers as major customers and stakeholders rather than final consumers. This route was 
chosen as the most likely to yield a better return on investments for shareholders. 
get better return on 
investment 
develop better chemicals 
faster to target pest 
other companies develop in 
vitro test of biochemical 
pathway 
find agent to target 
pathway (pest, pathogen) 
use gm … traditional 
methods 
interest farmers 
…consumers 
develop agents for 
seed treatment … 
chemical sprays 
Monsanto exists to make money for its 
shareholders 
use genomics, shift R&D 
priority to gm 
technique safe, 
effective, efficient, 
environmentally 
sound … more 
risky, random, may 
not work, inefficient 
Monsanto continues 
chemical development at 
Chesterfield 
make good investment 
decisions 
use biotech in traditional 
way 
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The annual report states “The agricultural pipeline includes 14 new biotechnology products in 
the 1999-2000 period. The list includes eight agronomic traits in seven major crops, led by 
Roundup Ready sugar beets in 1999. These “input” traits improve plant characteristics that 
affect growth or yield. The pipeline also includes six quality traits – “output” traits that 
enhance the food and fiber produced by the plant. Plans for 2003 and beyond from the 
Monsanto/Cargill ‘Renessen’ partnership include: 
• Corn enhanced with essential amino acids (animal feed) 
• Improved-energy corn (animal feed) 
• Improved energy wheat (animal feed) 
• Improved low-phytate corn (animal feed) 
• Improved milling wheat  
• Improved oil seeds (improved processing qualities) 
• Improved protein corn (animal feed) 
• Improved protein soybeans (animal feed) 
• (AR, 1998:21) 
The 1998 annual report does note that the nutrition division is also working on human food 
supplements designed to maintain healthy blood vessels and hearts and a high carotenoid 
canola to combat vitamin A deficiency (AR, 1998:21) 
3.2 R&D Spending and investments 
Figures on R&D spend are not easy to decipher. In 1998 the company spent $1.26 billion on 
R&D which is 15% of net sales. This includes agriculture and pharmaceutical and nutrition. 
Detailed breakdown of R&D spend does not appear to be publicly available. The Stock 
Exchange Commission reports filed every quarter provide some detail under a category 
called technological expenses (also used in the annual report). Quotes from recent reports 
indicate a very high level of spending in acquisitions. 
“Agricultural Products EBIT6 (excluding unusual items) decreased $25 million, or 8 
percent, the first quarter of 1999, compared with $306 million in the first quarter of 1998 
because increased sales were offset by increases in SGA7 and technological expenses 
rose primarily because of the inclusion in 1999 of the acquired seed companies and 
spending on crop biotechnology initiatives” (SEC quarterly report, March 1999). 
“Agricultural Products segment EBIT (excluding unusual items) of $818 million for the first 
six months of 1998, a 2 percent decrease. The impact of increased sales for the 
Agricultural Products segment in the first half of 1999 compared with the first half of 1998 
was more than offset by increase in SG&A and technological expenses, and amortization 
costs. The inclusion in 1999 of the acquired seed companies and spending on crop 
biotechnology initiatives caused an increase in SG&A and technological expenses in the 
first six months of 1999” (SEC quarterly report, June 1999). 
3.3 Marketing Innovation 
Monsanto has created a new structure for developing and marketing its biotechnology based 
products. It has both formed multiple agreements and partnerships and acquired seed 
companies and then pursued a strategy of licensing its technology to farmers. In the words of 
one manager: 
                                                     
6 Earnings before income tax. 
7 Selling, general and administrative expense 
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We’ve had to learn how to do business differently…we’ve traditionally been in 
businesses where we’ve developed a chemical, sold it through dealerships to 
farmers, who came and bought it and said, I want that product, and it says 
Monsanto on it. I don’t think there is a single bag of seed out there that has 
Monsanto on it, it has something about our technology on it, but if you look at soya 
beans, I think we have interests in two different soya bean companies in the US, 
but we have licensed the technology to literally hundreds. I think the number is 
well over 300 this year, because there are many. Soya beans are grown in more 
than 20 states in the US, and there are many different varieties of soya beans that 
are grown, depending on the geographic location, and so we, if we were gonna be 
successful commercially, we have to make the trait available by licensing, so we 
do the insertion, and then the trait is back crossed into other lines, by the seed 
companies, and they do that work. 
According to managers interviewed, acquisition has become increasingly important to 
Monsanto’s innovation and marketing strategy. The logic here is that simply selling the 
technology is not enough; the seeds also have to be excellent and appealing to farmers. 
Integration between all parts of the business is necessary and agricultural biotechnology 
needs to be marketed as a package. 
The strategy is linked to finding large blockbuster products (Verfaillie presentation and 
interviews).  
Monsanto is very very good…in all its businesses at building block-busters. 
[We’re] not very good at actually having portfolios and developing portfolios, we’re 
very good at building block-busters in all our businesses. 
Senior Monsanto Manager 
Monsanto has opposed segregating GM crops from non GM crops8. The idea is to 
sell products very widely in bulk. 
3.4 Acquisitions 
The company spent a huge amount on acquisitions. In 1998 alone, “Monsanto acquired 
DEKALB Genetics Corp., Cargills international seed business, and Plant Breeding 
International Cambridge Ltd (PBIC), and entered into an agreement to merge with Delta and 
Pine Land Co. Monsanto’s total investment in 1998 was more than $4 billion” (AR, 1998:11). 
Since 1996, Monsanto spent over $8 billion in acquisitions. (Fortune, 29.03.99) 
Monsanto has pursued an ambitious acquisitions strategy in some cases paying top prices. 
Cognitive map 2 provides a senior manager’s explanation of the way in which Monsanto 
judges a company’s value to its business. 
                                                     
8 Company managers point out that it does not have control over farmers to whom seeds are sold.  
ANNEX C11 
21 
Map 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The distinctive characteristic of this method is that the value of potential acquisitions is 
measured in part by the contribution it could make to Monsanto. There is no pretence at an 
‘objective’ value. Another manager explains it following terms: 
When we valued PBI we actually valued it…from a number of criteria – on its 
current business, what the current business was worth, over a period of time, 
using net present value classic methodologies to value businesses – so we 
decided how much it was worth on that basis, that was current business. We 
looked at what additional value having access to PBI and all its assets would bring 
to our highbred business – so there’s value there. We looked at…how its influence 
on our highbred business would bring value to our biotechnology traits…and then 
we also looked at PBI in terms of what it gave us, from the point of view of what 
we call option value – option value is a term or concept which comes mainly from 
the oil industry…its used where, if you own a particular asset, you then have an 
option to invest further in that asset to gain extra value. So there was an option 
value associated with PBI as well…(Monsanto senior manager). 
Monsanto has not always decided to buy early however. Whilst the Delta and Pineland 
acquisition is now off, it is illustrative of Monsanto’s approach. In the case of Delta & Pine 
Land, a period of successful collaboration was followed by attempted acquisition.   The 
purchase was deemed necessary because although Bt cotton has sold extremely well, the 
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use PBI as base for all 
cereals R&D and European 
business
bought PBI PBI near a major 
university
V-P asked how we 
would make it happen 
proposed purchase to 
Monsanto V-P 
judged that PBI was obvious 
company   to buy 
judge option value 
(ownership allows 
investment to 
increase it’s value)
judge PBI’s value to Monsanto
judge value of current business 
to Unilever 
value to Unilever (= current business + 
add value to us) 
made pre-emptive bid 
before Unilever decided to 
sell PBI 
judge additional value to our hybrids 
and biotech traits 
ANNEX C11 
22 
We obviously feel that we have to own the seed company. One of the things we 
used to be very bad at, I think, is that we used to think that our gene was what 
gave seed value – because our gene enabled the…value of a seed to be 
increased – the Bt gene for example. But in fact, of course, the seed industry, the 
seed business, which we are now in, is responsible for marketing tens of 
thousands of genes and traits, in every seed, so I think we…have probably 
realised that…all the gene traits, including the ones we’re inserting create 
value….If you talk to Delta Pine farmers, after they’ve planted for one year, and 
seen huge yields benefits and made a lot of money of it, would still argue – 
because the original variety was not the best variety that was on the market, the 
reason for that was because of lead times – you know seed varieties only have a 
limited life span, generally, and then a new one comes along 2 or 3 years later and 
it’s incrementally better – so the one that this one went into was sort of last year’s 
model. That’s an oversimplification but it was clear that if you talk to farmers the 
year after, even though they’d had a really successful year, they said, if another 
company, another seed company, cotton seed company, came out with another 
cotton seed non GM that they thought was better for all those other traits, disease 
resistance, yields, drought tolerance, whatever it was they were looking for, 
strength of fiber, all that sort of stuff – they would swap back from GM rather than 
just sticking with GM – so its that understanding of the value of every single gene 
trait, that I think is the significance here. That’s one thing that’s changed. On the 
other hand, and this is a personal opinion, an immense amount of the phenomenal 
relationship that we have with Delta Pine, when we did our joint venture, was 
down to the personality and integrity of the individuals involved in the deal. And 
the person who did the deal is now head of seeds for Monsanto, and the personal 
integrity of that individual, was such that every time the contract, or whatever, it 
was,..was reached for because there was an impasse or a problem, in our working 
together, this individual would be summonsed to deal with it, and in the end of 
course, that’s unsustainable for a big corporation…(Senior Monsanto manager). 
Monsanto could be thought to have lost heavily out of this deal; ironically Delta & Pine Land 
prospered enormously from the sale of Monsanto’s Bt technology and the company’s value 
rocketed.  
I don’t see why we had to buy it, I really don’t see why we had to buy it…when I 
think in 1993 or something we could have paid $30 million for it and when we 
bought it we paid $1.8 billion or something like that…we ended up…paying back 
every penny we made (Senior Monsanto manager). 
Monsanto has now withdrawn its offer for Delta and Pineland, blaming the failed acquisition 
on the US Justice Department.  
Company documents put the case that the benefits of owning seed companies are clear. The 
1998 annual report claims that Asgrow (aqcuired in 1997) has played a key role in the rapid 
expansion of RR soybeans, with its elite germplasm, brand equity and channel access (AR 
1998: 13). Additionally, 
“Monsanto will be able to widen the availability of traits and establish a competitive 
world-wide position in major crops…With the addition of these seed businesses, 
Monsanto will be able to deliver solutions to growers in an industry that is being 
transformed from a price-drive commodity market into one in which quality and 
innovation yield higher values and greater returns” (AR, 1998:11). 
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The following figure shows projected income from the acquired seeds businesses. 
Figure 5 Combined seed business positioned for rapid growth. 
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One important aspect of Monsanto’s acquisition strategy, according to one manager, is that it 
reflects the company’s belief in technology. This technology-led ethos runs deep in the 
company. Map 3 shows one manager’s thinking about this issue.  
Map 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is an overall goal of the company to pursue a technology led strategy. Whilst Monsanto 
employs a sophisticated decision making tool called Strategic Decision Analysis (SDA), the 
outcomes of this process are often overridden. Monsanto practice is to stay a world leader on 
the technology front rather than make better commercial decisions. The discrepancy between 
the analysis-based and vision-based decision approaches is particularly apparent over the 
issue of acquisitions. In notable cases, SDA would indicate that acquisition might not be the 
best strategy. Still, Monsanto has decided to go ahead with acquisitions. This reflects the 
overall vision which drives the company and which is fostered by the CEO. It means that 
details are not always fully taken into account and that sometimes “sub-optimal decisions” 
are made. The map portrays well the tensions between maintaining technology at the centre 
of strategy and making short term financial decisions. 
3.5 Patent licenses and disputes 
Patenting and licensing are extremely important components of Monsanto’s innovation 
strategy. As a leader in the development and introduction of new technology, the company 
uses patents and licenses both to bring in new science and technology and to expand its 
market reach. A drawback to the strategy is that there is a considerable amount of legal 
activity that the company must deal with. Appendix 2 contains a summary of some of 
Monsanto’s agreements, patent claims and disputes.  
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4. R&D Decision making: organisation and culture 
Monsanto is an American company. As one manager put it, in Europe “[as an American 
corporation] we’re perceived to be powerful and we’re over here”. Whilst local operators have 
a large degree of freedom in how to implement strategy, strategy itself has clearly been 
driven from the centre. The company also cultivated strong links with US politicians and US. 
In line with strong US leadership, an important component of Monsanto strategy has been its 
efforts to establish a very strong presence in key US agriculture markets. However, outside 
the US and with other chemical and food companies, Monsanto’s style has provoked intense 
hostility. Moves are now being made to change. Discussions with NGOs and the decision to 
halt work on the ‘Terminator’ gene are indicators of a new approach. Organisational 
decentralisation discussed later may also be significant. 
Monsanto is organised in multidisciplinary teams. Teams are based around crops, regions 
and products and include members from different functions. So, for example, the wheat team 
will have marketing, regulatory, ag-chem and biotech membership. Teams put forward plans 
to the senior management team. 
“The strategic business teams are there to actually look at the crop for which they 
are responsible, and actually think of how Monsanto’s technologies fit within that 
crop. There are technologies which go across al crops, there are technologies 
which are crop specific, and it’s the job of the business teams to think about the 
crop, think about the technologies, think about the geographies and come up with 
projects and products that make sense” (Senior Monsanto manager). 
The same manager said that most of the teams are based in St. Louis, although they include 
members from all regions. The exception is the wheat team which has a base in the UK as 
well as the US. Efforts are being made to devolve team structures. 
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The team structure is an important part of Monsanto culture as shown in Map 4. 
Map 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to this manager the belief is that teams deliver more value; they contribute more 
than the sum total of individuals could deliver. The map also shows that teams are thought to 
be very important in the context of a diverse global life sciences company where information 
is key.  
However, the team spirit runs in parallel with the dominant ethos of technological excellence 
and vision driven decision making which dominates decision making in the company. It is this 
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perhaps not so much to do with the structure of the company, but more to do with 
organisational culture. 
“Monsanto is like a shoal of fish and the shoal of fish…changes shape, and it 
changes direction, and moves seemingly without a direct lead in that shoal of fish, 
but it moves for the benefit for the whole of the shoal. If you look at any individual 
fish within the shoal any individual fish…within his sphere moving in different 
directions to the shoal as a whole, being carried along by the shoal but moving in 
different directions, testing where the limits are – Monsanto’s very much like that 
actually – it’s like a shoal of fish, it moves along as a whole – in the correct 
direction, but within your shoal you could have have a lot of alternative movement 
in different directions….I’ve never found people in Monsanto say ‘you can’t do 
that’’’ (Senior Monsanto manager).  
The strategic direction is said by managers to be strong with a high level of informality. The 
following senior manager is talking about the way in which a proposal to make the large PBI 
acquisition came about. 
I was in St.Louis in February 98, by pure chance I spoke with for 10, 15 minutes 
with Henrik Varfaillie…and we were talking about how things were going in Europe 
and all the rest of it and I said “yeah we really need to buy PBI to actually give the 
strength to the wheat group we’d been talking about”….He said “right, how are you 
gonna make that happen”. Well, you know, go and make that happen and we took 
that as a sort of green light to start building our pre-emptive bid…(Senior 
Monsanto manager). 
Another senior manager talks about the impact of the current CEO, Bob Shapiro, on the 
business: 
..he is a visionary…he’s a wonderful concepts man, he’s an inspiring concepts 
man…he just gets frustrated by the sort of institutional barriers and human nature 
barriers that prevent this corporation…from blowing the socks of the universe. And 
if there was any criticism of him it would be that, actually you have to really sharp 
to operate in that environment and not get a bit lost – he is so passionate and he 
encourages people to follow their passions so much that sometimes work doesn’t 
get done – sometimes detail gets missed out – never on the technology, never on 
the technology, but when it actually comes to dotting Is and crossing Ts on all the 
stuff that surrounds it, all the stuff that I suspect he’d like to wish away…we have 
allowed ourselves, under his leadership, to not bother with the details. The big 
picture stuff is fascinating – you know the ‘save the world’ and here’s the 
technology that’s gonna do it, but the intracacies of how particular products go to 
achieve various things in a particular market…(Senior Monsanto manager) 
Organisational changes are being implemented. The problem is seen as one of not dealing 
well with non-US cultures and of needing to decentralise.  
According to one senior manager, Monsanto is at a crossroads. The company is confronting 
difficult decisions and change at a number of levels. One response to the perceived crisis is 
to commit to further decentralisation. “The biggest problem we have is ‘getting it’, 
understanding nuances of different cultures”  the manager says and the response is to 
increasingly allow strategy to be made locally.   Thus, while operational decisions have 
always been delegated, now local teams will be allowed to take decisions that may impact on 
the US and overall strategy. The other side of this coin is, however, to increase the extent to 
which local managers buy into the central vision; “Corporate ethics need to be understood 
and ingrained by every single person”. This will give top management in the US the 
confidence to relinquish its hold on strategic decision making and enable a greater degree of 
trust in people’s reactions.  
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Decentralisation is then running in parallel with new emphasis on understanding the overall 
mission of the company and personal loyalty. New structures are also being implemented. 
One manager commented that previously, Monsanto management had been based on chaos 
management theory. It was like ‘a pinball machine’ which batted decisions around amongst 
the multidisciplinary teams. This is being replaced with a ‘Strategy committee’ which meets 
once a week and through which all R&D and product development decisions have to pass. 
Also, Europe and Africa have been placed under the leadership of one manager.  
5. Concept of clean technology and product by the company 
Monsanto’s understanding of sustainability relies heavily on the power of biotechnology and 
genomics. The idea is that increasingly sophisticated use of genetic information can replace 
the use of materials and energy and reduce harmful effects on the environment. The 
challenge is to begin to de-couple economic growth from growth in the use of energy and raw 
materials (RSD, 1997:2) A life cycle assessment is used to evaluate the sustainbility of 
production and products. In conceptual terms, Monsanto’s view of sustainability is close to 
USDA’s interpretation. It endorses agricultural practices which enhance environmental quality 
and the natural resource base whilst sustaining economic viability (RSD, 1997). 
Monsanto’s approach to sustainability is to demonstrate that with new technology and new 
information possibilities, there need not be a trade off between feeding a rapidly growing 
population or preserving natural habitats for bio-diversity. The task is to do both with more 
sustainable high-yield agriculture. The company views the risks of not pursuing high yield 
agriculture, including biotechnology, as high. Bob Shapiro is quoted as saying,  
“Using information is one of the ways to increase productivity without abusing nature. A 
closed system like the earth’s can’t withstand a systematic increase of material things, 
but it can support exponential increases of information and knowledge. If economic 
development means using more stuff then those who argue that growth and 
environmental sustainability are incompatible are right. And if we grow by using more 
stuff, I’m afraid we’d better start looking for a new planet…. But sustainability and 
development might be compatible if you could create value and satisfy people’s needs by 
increasing the information component of what’s produced and diminishing the amount of 
stuff”. 
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Map 5 shows one senior manager’s thinking around sustainability.  
Map 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sustainability is central to Monsanto’s strategy and the establishment of related institutional 
forms, such as the Sustainable Business Fund* is designed to give it a high profile. It is 
acknowledged that ideally a more “strategic” rather “tactical” approach to policy might have 
been beneficial; as it is Monsanto often reacts to policy signals rather than a more pro-active 
approach.   On the other hand, the manager thinks that technology has its own logic and 
development of new technology can perhaps only ever be regulated in retrospect, rather than 
specifically designed to fit future policy priorities. Global regulatory solutions are needed in 
today’s international business environment.    
The manager also notes that current products, such as herbicide resistance, whilst they may 
offer environmental benefits are difficult to portray as ‘sustainable products’. A number of 
products, which are more easily portrayed as ‘sustainable’ and have clear health benefits, are 
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in the pipeline. However, these will not be at a commercial stage of development in the next 
couple of years (Interviews). 
Monsanto holds that herbicide resistant and Bt cotton have both been shown to result in 
lower use of chemical inputs. Conservation tillage is significant in the United States, Latin 
America and Southern Europe. The unprecedented steps taken to intervene in farmers’ 
management of Bt cotton in order to minimise resistance in insects is put forward by the 
company as evidence of its high degree of awareness about sustainability issues (HBS, 
1997). New EPA regulations here made it mandatory for farmers to limit the amount of B7 
Cotton used in an effort to limit resistance build-up. Monsanto has endorsed these 
regulations. An additional advantage of Monsanto’s decision to market directly to farmers is 
the extensive database, which it has at its disposal to monitor environmental and product 
factors (interview). 
In 1997, Monsanto commissioned an independent study on sustainability and the Roundup 
Ready soyabean system. Key findings of the study are as follows: 
Sustainability and the Roundup Ready Soyabean System 
• The Roundup Ready soyabean system provides better weed control and reduces crop injury 
compared to regular soyabean-herbicide systems. 
• Because the System provides better weed control and reduces crop injury, it improves farm 
efficiency by optimizing yield, using arable land more efficiently, saving time for the farmer, 
reducing herbicide use in season, reducing foreign matter in grain and eliminating crop rotation 
restrictions. 
• Because the System provides better weed control, it encourages the adoption of conservation 
tillage, especially no-till – a farming method that leaves the soil undisturbed except for planting 
and nutrient injection. 
• No-till promotes sustainability in agricultural production systems – an economically viable 
method of agriculture emphasizing environmental stewardship of the land – which is good for 
the farmer and good for the environment. 
Herbicide Use for In-Season Weed Control in the Roundup Ready Soyabean System 
• In 1996 and 1997, herbicide use was, on the average, lower in Roundup Ready soyabean 
fields than in other U.S. soyabean fields, partly because growers were able to achieve superior 
weed control without preventive herbicide treatment (e.g. soil-incorporated herbicides), which 
are traditionally used before planting of the crop as “insurance” against weeds that might 
appear later (Monsanto, Backgrounder, April, 1998). 
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The following table, taken from the dossier, outlines some of Monsanto’ claims for the 
environmental benefits of the technology. 
The figures below compare Monsanto’s crops with pesticide-treated crops, mainly from 
results in North America. Monsanto sources are cited with abbreviations. 
 
Bollgard (Bt) cotton: reductions in insecticide sprays  
1996: 90% reduction on 1.8m acres; 7% yield increase (info from RSD) 
1997: 85% reduction on 2.5m acres: 14% yield increase in Southeastern USA 
(Achievements 1997) 
NewLeaf potato: reductions in insecticide sprays  
1996: 40% reduction on 10k acres (RSD) 
1997: 40% reduction on 30k acres; 5% yield increase (B&W, 1998: 136) 
YieldGard maize 
1996: 8% yield increase (RSD) 
field tests: 10-15% yield increase (B&W, 1998: 140) 
[Little maize was formerly sprayed with insecticide, for lack of an effective one, so Bt 
maize has little scope for reducing insecticide use.] 
RR soybean: reductions in herbicide sprays 
1997: 22% average reduction, ranging between 11-30% (B&W, 1998: 140) 
Some independent studies are far more variable. These are discussed in the concluding 
section. 
6. Macro-economic factors and public policies 
Overall, policies seem to be dealt with on tactical rather than strategic level.  
…Are we looking at the policy issues more from a tactical standpoint? I must say, 
we probably have, no-one would want to say that, we would much rather say we 
have included them into our strategic thinking (Senior Monsanto manager). 
Policies which were not mentioned in interviews include science, technology and innovation 
policies.  
6.1 Risk regulation and public perception 
…the fact that only 9 products have been through the…EU system, versus 30 in 
the US – the fact that the 9220 deliberate release process is under constant 
scrutiny and is being looked at now and from a revision standpoint…those are the 
policies that really affect us. (Senior Monsanto Manager) 
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Map 6 shows one Monsanto manager’s thinking around regulation. 
Map 6 
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new medicines/pharmaceuticals) to be established. Approval by this body would 
apply for all EU countries (Senior Monsanto manager) 
Recent experience has made the company “cynical and pragmatic” about European 
regulatory systems.   In one manager’s opinions the regulatory structures which have been 
set up are ill suited for current purposes. Regulatory agencies were designed to brief 
politicians about whether new technologies were safe rather than “tell a risk vacuous public 
whether products are safe”. Risk regulatory agencies are not designed to communicate to 
broad sections of the public, they are technical bodies. 
One manager predicted greater regulatory hurdles for chemical products in future. This may 
ease the passage of GM products.  
Policies dealing with herbicides or pesticides are certainly having an impact. We 
think its actually positive for us. Some of the critics argue that GM crops wil cause 
higher use of pesticides, we wouldn’t think that’s the case….We also think that it’s 
a more sustainable way of producing food, that particularly with the insect tolerant 
crops you much less product. With herbicide tolerant crops you still use 
herbicides, but hopefully you use one that has a nice environmental profile, and 
you get superior weed control, which gets maximum value of the crops. That’s our 
story (Senior Monsanto manager). 
…pesticide reform, yes, that affects us…our ag vision is abundant food and a 
healthy environment – and we recognise that the constraints on the traditional 
business that we were in, which was agrochemicals, were only going to get 
greater, the actual hurdles were only going to get higher and more costly to 
overcome…that affects what we did and why we did it and will continue to do so 
(Senior Monsanto manager). 
Specific concerns about the way in which glyphosate might be affected by European 
regulations were not mentioned, although it might be that if interviews were carried out now 
this might be a greater concern.  
There is also a feeling that current favour shown towards organic agriculture might be short-
lived. 
I’m waiting for the first time that we have an outbreak of E. coli in the United 
Kingdom which is traced back to using animal manure on organic food, and the 
first time that hits – and then the question will be asked of Safeway or Sainsbury’s, 
you know, how are ensuring that there was no cross contamination…I’m waiting 
for that one, how that’s gonna be handled….  
Managers are aware that Monsanto has not succeeded in winning over public opinion in 
Europe. Links between risk regulation and public perception are not articulated except in 
manager’s perception that a breakdown in trust is at the root of calls for further regulation and 
rejection of the technology (interviews).  
There is also now a perception that Monsanto is not able to deliver reassurance to the public. 
“Its no good if it comes from us”. Managers acknowledge that it is difficult for consumers to 
perceive the benefits of the technology as products are designed for farmers’ benefits rather 
than end consumers (interviews). 
No current plans exist to withdraw from Europe as a result of perceived difficulties with public 
opinion (interviews). The timelines for R&D are too long for the difficulties to have had an 
impact on decision making. In answer to a question about whether negative public perception 
and regulation would impact on R&D, one manager said the following: 
The simple answer is no, but we have a more realistic view of the time-frames and 
we have a view that we just can’t develop a product and introduce it – we have to 
work with the constituent groups, the food industry, the retailers, and that’s difficult 
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because there are lots of views about this…but we are still committed to the 
technology (Senior Monsanto Manager). 
Even the move towards product which give more direct consumer benefits is “absolutely 
science led”. This is because you can’t tell in advance what will sell.  
A number of managers expressed the view that ‘public’ opinion is not so much the problem. 
The problem is that the press sees a good story and that retailers respond to that and interest 
groups play a key role in fuelling the problem. 
There is a feeling in the company that more could have been do to promote the technology 
earlier and that governments could have played a bigger role. 
I wish we had done more of it…I wish we had worked more with the food 
companies and more with the science media, to put educational information in 
front of people, in places where we did that we had some positive results, one 
country in Europe where acceptance of the technology seems to be…successful is 
the Netherlands, there are many products that are labelled, but the government 
sponsored an information programme, there were public information sources that 
people could turn to, the government stood very much behind the technology, for 
the standpoint that they had reviewed it, that they affirmed its safety….Maybe its 
partly cultural, I think partly it is, but the other mistake to make…it is an important 
one not to make, is to assume that there is some Europe approach or Europe 
attitude. There’s far less similarity in Europe than there is in the US (Senior 
Monsanto Manager). 
Towards the end of 1999, very senior company managers began to go beyond a desire to 
educate, and began to stress their interest in listening. A manager disowned an earlier very 
high profile UK advertising campaign saying “We do not see the environment as something 
that will change by a PR initiative” (Dow Jones Newswires, Oct 6, 1999). The company called 
a halt to its ‘terminator technology’ and attempted to engage in dialogue with NGOs such as 
Greenpeace and the Soil Association. Bob Shapiro addressed a Greenpeace conference 
saying: “We have been working on it (biotechnology) for 20 years, and that is the source of 
[our] convictions, but because of that, I think we have tended to see it is our task to convince 
people, in short that we are right and that by extension people who have different points of 
view are wrong or at best misguided…. We behave then as though this is or should be a 
debate and unintended result of that has privately been that we have irritated and 
antagonised more people than we have persuaded… because we thought it was our job to 
persuade too often we have forgotten to listen”. The aim now is to engage in “Stakeholder 
dialogue” (F.T. 11/11/99). 
6.2 Trade, environmental and market regulation 
Environmental regulations are in the minds of interviewees likely to become increasingly 
rigorous. However, because of measures taken in the direction of sustainability, Monsanto is 
confident of its capacity to deal with environmental policy pressures.  
The company took an early decision not to segregate GM and non GM crops and has 
encouraged moves from the WTO to force Europe to accept unlabelled GM products. For 
commodity crops, the company perceived that segregation was not economically viable, nor 
was it something that the company could control.  
…retailers believe that they have to take the GM out of animal feed supply – now 
that’s not a problem, there are lots of people in the world who will offer you GM 
free soya and corn, there are lots of people who are doing that, but they are 
charging a price for it. And the retailers won’t pay a penny more…there is potential 
for lots of promises and smoke and mirrors and, you know, ‘we’re now GM free’ – 
you know actually they’re not, because you can’t detect it…members of the food 
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chain are getting very, very tense and very aggressive about their capacity to 
produce GM free animal feed – you can’t measure it, you can’t get hold of it – and 
the only way you can get hold of it is to pay a premium and at the moment retailers 
are unprepared to do that….The biggest problem we’ve got at the moment is that 
our name is mud because we are perceived to have caused this problem…we 
don’t trade the beans, we sell seed, people buy it….Market forces will prevail…the 
investment [for two channels] is huge and there’s no need for it from a substantial 
equivalence point of view and the fact that it hasn’t happened, the effect of that is 
that you know people can’t make money from it, otherwise everybody would have 
done it – but people have run the numbers and decided its just too risky, and 
they’re not gonna, you know we’re talking commodities here, so the market just 
isn’t there (Senior Monsanto manager). 
Interviewees considered reform of CAP and Agenda 2000 measures as tactical or 
operational rather than strategic issue. The direction of reform is towards greater market 
liberalisation, but this will not happen quickly. “CAP reform is going to be stepwise, its going 
to be incremental, not fundamental…” 
For the most part Monsanto managers have enormous faith in market liberalisation. Market 
pressures will force farmers to become more efficient and this will favour new products such 
as herbicide resistant varieties. It is the lack of competition, which poses more of a problem. 
Market liberalisation will force a demonstration effect and this will increase the rate of uptake 
of new products. Monsanto therefore considers itself to be prepared for the future 
combination of tighter environmental controls and market liberalisation and has prepared a 
strategic document entitled Agriculture 2020 which looks at population, GDP, use of wealth in 
addition to market and environmental trends. Policies are taken into account in these long 
term plans but not in day to day decisions (Interviews). “…WTO and GATT affect world trade 
practices, we cannot affect world trade practices, our investment decisions don’t affect that, 
and its unlikely that world trade practices…are sufficiently specific to affect our investment 
practices – its not a fine tool and investment decisions tend to be based on fine tools…” 
(Senior Monsanto manager).  
Thus, EU enlargement and WTO intervention are both considered in strategic thinking. 
Eastern Europe is considered a potentially large market and one perhaps more open to GM 
crops. Indeed more local policies, such as decisions made over Central and Eastern 
European countries’ accession to the EU, would be much more likely to affect investment 
decisions (Interview).  
One manager expressed concern over the broader impacts of market liberalisation. The 
number of small farmers who would be put out of business complicates the politics. This 
manager thought it unlikely that the Blair government would oversee the destruction of an 
estimated 80% of farmers, which the manager predicted would go under if full CAP reform 
were implemented. 
Other regulatory issues were not mentioned as being significant in strategic or tactical 
thinking. One manager also stressed that in terms of decision making, the technological 
possibilities dominated. 
In answer to a question about how long term projections are use and whether they impact on 
immediate R&D decisions, the manager said: 
The simple answer is no. We have done the analysis of looking at…food, 
population, the interrelationship between food needs and population growth in 
different regions of the world, we have looked at specific regions and what the 
needs might be but the fact is that the controlling factors in the technology 
development are usually the technology issues themselves, how hard it is to 
transform a crop, how successful we are in being able to put a trait in a crop, do 
the fieldwork, assure ourselves that it’s efficacy is there, that the safety is 
there….people always ask us, why did we go with BST as one of your first 
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products, well we did because that was one of the first pieces of technology 
development that came out, we could the transformation and the fermentation 
technology was there to produce the protein so we did it, we never dreamed that it 
would be as controversial as it was, but its been very successful from a 
commercial standpoint in the US (Senior Monsanto manager). 
Going back to cognitive map 6, it is interesting to note that this manager thought that 
potential exists for governments to create a more conducive environment for innovation in 
more sustainable products and processes. This could be done by creating regulations that 
foster specific innovations. The constraint is thought to be that politicians are reluctant to 
raise taxes. 
IPR regulation was mentioned as being generally important by managers but not as a 
specific component of policy which the company is currently responding to at the R&D level. 
Obviously patent and licensing disputes are very important aspects of Monsanto’s day to day 
concerns. 
7. Conclusions: An uncertain future 
Monsanto’s approach to agricultural innovation is summarised in the following cognitive map. 
Map 7 is based on interviews and other sources of information used in this monograph. 
Map 7 
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-
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The approach is being questioned by outsiders and in some respects by company managers. 
There are four primary areas of uncertainty: Commercial uncertainty; technical and 
environmental uncertainty; uncertainty about the way in which the company has dealt with 
non-farmer stakeholders; and uncertainty about regulation and public opinion. 
7.1 Commercial uncertainty 
Until very recently, Monsanto has been the accepted industry leader in biotechnology. It is a 
major player in the seeds industry and a significant presence in ag-chems primarily due to 
Roundup.   Monsanto is in a paradoxical situation. Its current commercial sales for Round-up 
are high and the adoption rates for the new crops in the US have been good. Yet, forecasts 
are grim and stock values have plummeted. Even the company’s assessments of itself reflect 
this and there is clearly a feeling that major changes will need to be made. (Monsanto New 
York Stock Exchange Quarterly Report , August 16 1999).  
A major issue is future acceptance of new biotechnologies. Doubts have also been raised 
about the effectiveness of all products. For example, a USDA report called into question 
some company claims about reduced use of chemicals as a result of using herbicide 
resistant products (USDA, 1999). Monsanto’s strategy is based on optimistic assumptions 
about growth in the gm plant and product market which less favourable reports suggest may 
not be realistic (HBS, 1997; HBS, 1996). 
A worrying outlook was made worse with Deutsche Bank’s advice to investors to sell shares 
in companies involved in the development of GMOs. Deutsche Bank warns that “growing 
negative sentiment” is creating problems for the leading companies, including Monsanto. 
Deutsche Bank’s research report comments “We predict that GMOs, once perceived as a bull 
case for this sector, will now be perceived as a pariah” (Guardian, August 25 1999). 
The company is heavily indebted and there are doubts about its survival. A merger with 
American Home Products (AHP) fell through in early 1999. Industry analysts close to 
Monsanto predicted throughout 1999 that without a successful merger the company would 
not have the market and product reach to weather current and short/medium term difficulties.  
Latin America is a particularly key and vulnerable area. The most recent Stock Exchange 
Commission Report warns of economic difficulties in the region could cause serious 
problems. Ongoing disputes about Brazil’s acceptance of GMOs must also pose a significant 
threat. 
The company’s share price fell from more than $49 in March 1999 to less than $34 in 
September 1999. It rose in November to over $44. The rise was fuelled by disclosure that 
Monsanto had held talks on a restructuring with Novartis and Bayer (FT, Nov 11,1999). Since 
then Novartis has confirmed a merger with the agricultural wing of Astra Zeneca. A report 
from the Bloomberg news agency on Nov 18th reported that Bayer and Monsanto were still in 
negotiations.  
In late December, Monsanto announced a merger with Pharmacia and UpJohn. Initially, the 
plan was to retain all parts of the company. Within a day, however, the fall in share price of 
both companies, forced an announcement that the agriculture division would be sold off. The 
future for Monsanto Agriculture remains unclear. It now seems almost certain, however, that 
Monsanto will split its agricultural and pharmaceutical businesses, thereby ending the life 
sciences dream of CEO Robert Shapiro (Chicago, Bloomberg, Nov 19, 1999). 
Monsanto is facing a very high degree of uncertainty in the immediate future. The principal 
uncertainty is to do with the agriculture division. Public opinion and regulatory structures are 
crucial to the company.   Its immediate response has been to move towards further 
decentralisation in the hope that managers closer to the ground will prove more successful in 
winning over consumers and regulators. Observers continually raise the question of a 
continued presence in a hostile EU environment. Managers, however, are adamant that 
Europe is central to strategy.    
The recent merger with UpJohn and Pharmacia promises more uncertainty for Monsanto 
agriculture. The stakes are very high. Monsanto’s wholesale endorsement of a strategy 
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based on biotech and its widespread unpopularity perhaps means that the agriculture division 
may not easily find buyers. 
One issue here is that Monsanto’s innovation and marketing strategy has had the farmer at 
its core. Monsanto managers point to the dramatic sales figures as evidence of the success 
of this strategy. Yet, all managers interviewed were concerned about the way in which final 
consumers do not see the benefits of the new technology. Additionally, dominance of the 
seed market has fuelled antagonism toward the company amongst farmers. A report on the 
EPA-USDA June 18 1999 Bt-corn Resistance Management Workshop by Charles Benbrook 
highlighted farmer complaints. 
“…Leon Corzine, an Illinois grower, stressed that farmers need to ask “Do I really need Bt 
corn?” He stated that many farmers in his area were forced to buy Bt-corn to get the best 
genetics suited to their soils and area. He said that the seed companies had farmers 
‘over a barrel’ and that in his opinion, seed companies should offer all new varieties and 
genetics with and without Bt so that farmers would always be able to have a choice. 
Other farmer panelists made this same point during the day, raising one of the key issues 
that surfaced during the meeting…” 
Farmers in the US have become increasingly hostile.   Thus, the strategy of identifying 
farmers as primary stakeholders has backfired in two major ways. First, farmers seem to be 
reacting negatively to perceived attempts to pressure them into buying GM crops. They are 
clearly worried by the response to GM in Europe and by whether concrete technical and 
environmental problems with the crops are going to cause them other problems. Second, 
products have not appealed to final consumers.  
7.2 Product uncertainty: Technical and environmental issues 
A 1999 USDA report called into question some company claims about reduced use of 
chemicals and increased yield. Also, soya genetically modified to be resistant to glyphosate 
herbicide (produced by Monsanto) is less drought tolerant than the non-GM variety, while 
gluphosinate resistant soya (produced by AgrEvo) apparently does not suffer from this 
defect.   The box below summarises some other controversies. 
Roundup 
EU: The European Commission has proposed to delay any decision to include 
glyphosate in Annex I of 91/414. As its rationale, ‘after application for the intended uses 
and in the correct manner, harmful effects on arthropods... cannot be excluded’, e.g. on 
several predators of insect pests (CEC, 1998). 
Unrelated research in Sweden suggested links between glyphosate and non-Hodgkins 
lymphoma (Hardell et al., 1999). 
Monsanto ‘absolutely refuted’ [denied] these claims. Environmental NGOs demanded 
an EU-wide ban (The Guardian, 13.10.99). 
RR-soybeans 
USA: Research suggested that RR-soybeans have lower nutritional value than 
conventional soybeans, due to lower levels of isoflavones (Niiler, 1999, citing Lappé in 
Jnl Medicinal Foods). 
Yield losses 
In hot weather the stems split open, resulting in crop losses of up to 40% yield. This 
effect is probably due to the 20% extra production of lignin, a side-effect of the 
metabolic pathway for glyphosate tolerance. The splitting could be a general problem in 
the southern USA and some Latin American climates (NS 20.11.99). 
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University study 
Found 10-20% lower yield from Monsanto’s gm soybean, compared to non-gm soya 
(Griffiths, 1999). 
UW-Madison study 
In 1998 Roundup-ready (RR) soybean varieties had an average 4-6% lower yield than 
conventional varieties, with wide variations between 86% and 113% of the conventional 
yield. There were just two areas where RR did better – Illinois and southern Michigan 
(Oplinger et al., 1999). 
In 1998 seed-plus-weed costs represented 23% of variable costs, while now with RR-
soybeans they represent 35-40%. It seems that the technology increased costs 
somewhat, but imposes a “price” farmers are willing to pay for the simplicity and 
robustness of the weed management system (Benbrook, 1999). 
The company clearly has not managed to overcome concern about genetic engineering itself. 
A large advertising campaign in the UK failed and, from an industry perspective, worsened 
the situation resulting in a closer identification of the technology with an unpopular company. 
7.3 Uncertainty about dealing with stakeholders 
The company has been led from the US. It cultivated strong links with US politicians. In line 
with strong US leadership, an important component of Monsanto strategy has been its efforts 
to establish a very strong presence in key US agriculture markets.  
Monsanto’s style has provoked intense hostility and moves are now being made to change. 
Discussions with NGOs and the decision to halt work on the ‘Terminator’ gene are indicators 
of a new approach. The company is keen to portray itself as ‘listening’ as well as informing. 
However, there are no indications yet that this approach is having a significant impact. 
Organisational decentralisation is also taking place with an emphasis on allowing non-US 
senior management more input into strategic decision making. The thinking here is that the 
company has to better understand cultural nuances and create more positive interactions 
with local stakeholders. It is unclear whether the type of changes underway will have a 
significant impact or how they will be affected by the recent merger. 
7.4 Uncertainty about risk regulation and public perception 
Monsanto took a leading role in arguing against risk regulation during the late eighties and 
much of the nineties. Although the company still calls for reform of the European system, the 
campaigning nature of these calls is not now evident. Whilst managers are reluctant to link 
the company’s approach to risk regulation to anti-GMO sentiments, there is now clearly a 
feeling that high profile anti-regulation campaigns are not appropriate.  
As with other chemical companies it is apparent that Monsanto lacks experience with, or 
adequate acknowledgement of, consumers and public opinion. Traditionally, final consumers 
have not been considered important stakeholders and the complexities of public opinion have 
not overly concerned strategists. It is possible that early decisions based on the defensive 
view that those who doubted the promise of biotechnology, or called for additional 
regulations, were all suspect, meant that opportunities to build constructive strategic alliances 
within the agro-food industries and with more supportive NGOs were not fully realised. 
8. Impact of policy 
The impression given in this monograph is that European and global level policy does not 
seem to have a major influence on R&D decisions or even on broader innovation decisions. 
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This is true to the extent that major R&D investments are made with long timescales in mind.   
There also does seem to be a gap between assessing trends in policy and pro-actively 
thinking about policy in terms of product development. There are some ways, however, in 
which policy impacts directly on decisions. 
• Monsanto has looked at the global policy environment and at CAP reform and has decided 
that the basic framework of largely freely operating markets is stable. Plans and assumptions 
are based on this analysis. 
• Risk regulation is clearly an important area which the company devotes a huge amount of time 
to trying to restructure. Efforts in the 1980s and most of the 1990s were primarily based on 
pushing for de-regulation. Now company policy is more pragmatic and conciliatory. The focus 
is on getting a workable system in place. Risk regulation policy, now to some extent driven by 
concerns of environmental groups, may yet have a significant impact on Monsanto policy. 
• The company has realised it has to change the way it deals with stakeholders and that it 
cannot win the debate about biotechnology by being purely adversarial with policy makers and 
key special interest groups. Ironically this realisation may have come sooner if the risk 
regulators had taken a tougher stance during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
• Monsanto’s lack of engagement with policy at the EU level may be indicative of a larger issue 
in that it may reflect the lack of policy dialogue between EU policy makers and companies. In 
the US, the picture of Monsanto’s engagement with policy makers would look different and this 
may be due to the way the that policy is discussed and formulated by policy makers as well as 
the fact that Monsanto is a US company. 
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‘Biotechnology and Consumer Issues: Where We Stand’, 1998 
‘GM Crops in the UK: Your Questions Answered’ 
K Baker and S Waters, evidence (written & oral), pp.132-154 in EC Regulation of Genetic 
Modification in Agriculture, 2nd report of the Select Committee of the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the European Communities, session 1998-1999, HL paper 11-I, December 
1998.  
A. Filippello, ‘The evolution of restructuring: seizing change to create value’, Business 
Economics January 1999: 25-28 [Chief Economist]. 
‘Ensuring the Safety of Products’, 1999, 
http://www.monsanto.com/ag/articles/BioBrochure/Page7.htm 
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Appendix 1 Cognitive mapping technique 
The technique of cognitive mapping is used throughout this monograph to present some of 
the information from interviews and also, in the overview section, to summarise the 
information from all interviews. The latter are labelled as summary maps to distinguish them 
from interview-based maps. When used to represent interview discussions, the maps follow 
the logic of the explanations given by interviewees. When used in the overview section, they 
represent our analytical interpretation of the company data. 
Rules for developing and interpreting cognitive maps are as follows: 
[Based on the Reference Manual for Decision Explorer Software, pp8-14, Banxia Software 
Limited, 141 St James Road, Glasgow G4 0LT.] 
Concepts 
Maps consist of concepts linked by arrows or lines. A concept is expressed as a short 
statement covering only a single idea or notion, for example assertions about components of 
a strategy, causes of a problem or means of improving a situation.  
Concepts involve two contrasting parts, i.e. they are bi-polar. Thus, where there is ‘…’ in the 
middle of a concept, this indicates X ‘rather than’ Y, as perceived by the person who made 
the statement (e.g. friendly … distant). If the second pole of this relationship is not specified 
in a concept it implies ‘X rather than not-X’ (friendly … not friendly). 
Where concepts are numbered, the numbers are purely for identification purposes - they 
have no other significance. 
Links 
Links describe relationships between concepts. Along with the concepts, they form a line of 
argument, a description of a problem or the components of a strategy.  
They can include a range of different types of relationship. The most usual are causal, 
connotative or temporal. However, user-defined links can also be added. 
Causal links. 
A  B indicates that concept A leads to, or contributes to, B or A affects B. 
Connotative links 
A –– B (i.e. a simple line, no arrow) implies that the two concepts are associated in an 
unspecified way. 
Temporal links 
A  B (with a letter ‘T’ attached to the arrow) implies that B follows in time from A.  
Positive and negative links 
Unless specified otherwise, links are assumed to be positive, i.e. the first pole of one concept 
leads to the first pole of the linked concept. Where a negative sign is attached to an arrow 
this indicates that the first pole of one concept leads to the second pole of the consequential 
concept. These conventions do not apply to connotative links. 
ANNEX C11 
45 
Appendix II Patents, licenses and related disputes. 
Herbicides: agreements with US competitors 
The Roundup patent continues only in the USA and will lapse there in the year 2000.  
In 1998 Monsanto gained EPA approval for RoundupUltra to be sprayed on RR-maize and 
soya. 
To protect its US herbicide markets from generic competition, Monsanto has devised extra 
measures, e.g. a price reduction in late 1998, and licence agreements with other firms:  
Dow: agreement for Monsanto to produce glyphosate (using materials from Dow) and to 
supply Dow, which will be entitled to use Monsanto’s registration data for its own 
formulations. Dow is entitled to market the herbicides for use on RR soybeans and cotton 
from the year 2000, and on RR maize from 2001. 
Other companies (Novartis, Cheminova, MicroFlo/BASF) are discussing similar 
arrangements.  
Zeneca is an exception, because it had already invested in registration of its own proprietary 
glyphosate salt (see litigation below). 
Other herbicides 
Rhône-Poulenc: 1997 agreement for RP’s Balance (isoxaflutole) to be combined with 
Monsanto’s Harness (based on acetanilde, related to alachlor, used on maize) in premixture. 
Anti-trust & patent licence measures 
Monsanto’s recent aquisitions would give it substantial sales of key seeds in the USA, as 
follows (Hayenga, 1998). 
 1997 1998 
soybeans 20% 25% 
cotton 84% 87% 
corn market 14%*  
(* plus Holden’s sells germplasm to other companies and supplies 1/4 of US maize seeds) 
The US Dept of Justice accepted Monsanto’s purchase of DeKalb by imposing anti-trust 
conditions, which led to the following commitments (not all specified by the DoJ):  
the Roundup-Ready gene will be licensed to any company wanting to use it; 
patent rights to the Agrobacterium-mediated gm maize technique will be transferred to UC 
Berkeley, which in turn may sub-licence; however, this patent anyway is subject to two 
accusations that it infringes other patents; 
Holden’s corn germplasm will be licensed to other seed companies; Holden’s customers may 
back-cross gm traits (developed by third parties) into Holden’s lines for 7 years; and 
Stoneville, the cotton-seed part of De Kalb, will be sold off (see below). 
Monsanto has tried to use some constraints as opportunities, e.g. by setting terms which 
encourage Roundup sales. 
Patents&licences on crop&genes (mainly from Hayenga, 1998) 
Monsanto has offered seed companies a financial incentive for boosting sales of crops which 
contain its gene, e.g. if they reach 2% of sales by 2000 and 85% of all herbicide-tolerant 
sales by 2002. 
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Monsanto has protected the income from its patents (e.g. on Roundup-Ready and Bt genes) 
by various means: 
breadth: claimed broad patents, to deter competitors from entering entire crop ranges; 
licence agreements: as means to gain revenue while minimizing competition and litigation; 
no ‘stacking’: other companies may not stack Monsanto’s RR gene with their other genes; 
farmers’ contracts: growers undertake not to save seed for re-sowing or selling, and to use 
only Roundup herbicides on RR-crops. 
Agreements not concluded 
In October 1997 Pioneer Hi-Bred decided not to include Monsanto’s RR gene in its seed 
corn, on grounds that Monsanto’s restrictions and high charges would outweigh the benefits 
to farmers. 
According to Monsanto: 
‘Licensing provides an additional means of delivering value to growers from our 
biotechnology traits. We continue to license our traits to more than 200 
independent seed companies...’ (AR 1998: 13). The company marketed more than 
10 biotech-related plant sciences products durng 1998 with its licensing partners, 
e.g. Bt and RR-crops (AR 1998: 34). 
Litigation by/against Monsanto 
Litigation on crops & genes  
Among biotech companies, Monsanto is probably the most litigated company, e.g.: 
Successful surveillance/litigation against farmers for infringement of 
contracts, regarding saved seed. 
Successfully defended its Bt technology as not infringing Novartis’ broad patent, which had 
claimed exclusive use of Bt in corn.  
Unsuccessfully accused Novartis and Mycogen of infringing its Bt patent.  
Unsuccessfully refused to licence its RR and Bt genes to Mycogen, which was awarded 
$172m damages from Monsanto, which in turn has appealed. 
Unsuccessfully defended use of a RR gene sublicenced from De Kalb, in turn licenced from 
Rhône- Poulenc before Monsanto bought De Kalb. Rhône-Poulenc argued that De Kalb was 
not entitled to transfer the gene to another company. A jury ruled that DeKalb had breached 
its agreement with R-P; the decision will pave the way for a further R-P action against 
Monsanto for patent infringement and trade-secret misappropriation (CPM 30.04.99). 
Settled in the case of Cargill’s international seed business inappropriately using Pioneer’s 
germplasm which had been acquired before the Monsanto purchase (CMR, 15.02.99).  
Litigation relevant to glyphosate/Roundup 
Background: Zeneca has registered its proprietary glyphosate salt herbicide, Touchdown. In 
1997 Zeneca terminated a glyphosate supply agreement with Monsanto and began 
producing its own glyphosate in the UK (CW, 12.08.98). 
Monsanto accused Pioneer of allowing use of Monsanto’s RR soybeans by Zeneca for 
testing Touchdown – as a patent infringement. 
Zeneca in turn sued Monsanto to establish its right to sell Touchdown for use on RR crops, 
contrary to Monsanto licences which prohibit farmers from using alternatives to Roundup.  
Litigation was ended by a settlement: Monsanto licences Zeneca to sell Touchdown, in return 
for a fee – called ‘modest’ by Zeneca, though not by Monsanto (FT, 13.03.99). Analysts 
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suggest that Zeneca may have to offer farmers a reduced price for Touchdown in order to 
compete with Roundup. 
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Monsanto’s acquisitions and gm crops 
  agronomic traits  consumer traits 
crop germplasm herbic-tol Bt* disease-
resist 
quality sales 
by 
     Calgene 
(many traits) 
Cargill 
(all 
crops?) 
soybean Asgrow, FLS  RR RR/Bt 
2002? 
 hi-stearate 
2000? 
 
potato PBIC 2002? NewLeaf NewLeaf+ 
(VirusY) 
  
maize Holden’s, SA,      
Cargill 
RR YieldGard 
2000?* 
yes lo-phytate 
high-oil 
SA 
cotton Calgene, DPL, 
Mahyco  
RR,  Bollgard 
2000?* 
BXN** 
  Mahyco  
OSR Cargill, PBIC RR 2000?  Laurical; 
hi-stearate, 
2000?  
 
tomato Calgene  2001? yes FlavrSavr  
squash Asgrow   Freedom II   
wheat HybriTech, PBIC   yes   
       
sunflower Cargill      
Table lists products in commercial use or in development (in italics).yes = being developed, among others  
The year is Monsanto’s prediction for the product launch (AR 1998: 22-23; also AR 1997: 24-26). 
* A second-generation of Bt genes is being designed to minimize the development of resistant insects by using a 
different mode of action, esp. for Bollgard. [AgrEvo has already marketed such a Bt maize product in the USA.]   A 
third-generation of Bt maize protects the crop from rootworm. 
** BXN: Rhône-Poulenc’s cotton combines its bromoxynil-tolerance gene with Monsanto’s Bt gene 
Company abbreviations 
FLS: First Line Seeds (Canada) 
DPL: Delta & Pine Land 
Mahyco : Maharashtra Hybrid Seed Company (India) 
PBIC: Plant Breeding International-Cambridge(UK) 
SA: Sementes Agroceres (Brasil) 
GM maize: agrochemical reductions and yield increases 
After many years of speculative arguments on these issues, as well as quantitative claims 
from Monsanto and industry-funded sources (see main dossier), independent studies in 
North America provided some data on gm maize, cotton and potatoes; these data fuelled 
further debate. The figures below focus on maize, for its greater relevance to Europe (since 
little soybean or cotton is cultivated there). The reports showed variations in results across 
ANNEX C11 
49 
regions and years. For Bt maize in particular: Unlike reliance on chemical insecticides, gm 
seed requires farmers to pay a premium in advance, without knowing whether they otherwise 
would have incurred yield losses; pest infestations are unpredictable from year to year. 
ERS study: Bt and herbicide-tolerant maize (USDA/ERS, 1999)  
Yield increased in 11 of 35 region-year combinations over three years, especially for Bt 
maize; yield increases were rare with herbicide-tolerant maize. 
Pesticide usage was similar for gm/non-gm maize overall. 
Somewhat increased revenues and lowered herbicide costs did not compensate for the 
higher seed costs and technology fees paid by farmers. 
U-Missouri study: Bt maize (Rose, 1999) 
Bt hybrids yield comparably to non-Bt hybrids, though lack of pressure from the ECB made Bt 
hybrids less profitable in Missouri this year. ‘Corn borer pressure is at a 10-year low in much 
of the Corn Belt, even in places where it is usually found.’ 
Iowa State-U study: Bt maize (AP, 1999) 
Study shows that farmers in the Midwest who planted Bt corn in 1996-1998 reduced their 
insecticide use each year: 26% of the farmers in 1998, 19% in 1997, and 13% in 1996. About 
half of the Bt-corn farmers surveyed said they don’t use insecticides. [Presumably this means 
that they never did use insecticides; nationally, over half never did so. 
